CloudWatch-CrossAccountAccess

Last Modified

Mar 12, 2026

March 12, 2026 at 09:28 PM UTC

Version

Total Versions

Created

Jul 23, 2019

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Risk

Medium

The same capabilities in a scoped form, resource policy writes, reads across all data, or full access to a whole service. Read from this policy document alone: trust policies, boundaries and SCPs in your account still decide what actually succeeds. How this is assessed

Medium
Can take over other users or roles
Grants the actions of 1 documented escalation path, but only on named resources or under a condition. Review that scope before trusting it.
- sts-001sts:AssumeRolescoped
  - sts:AssumeRole: on arn:aws:iam::*:role/CloudWatch-CrossAccountSharing*
Use with caution: Check which roles, users or policies fall inside the scope shown above. Within it the escalation works as documented, so keep privileged principals out of it.

Policy Document

View on GitHub

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21{
  "PolicyVersion": {
    "Document": {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
        {
          "Action": [
            "sts:AssumeRole"
          ],
          "Resource": [
            "arn:aws:iam::*:role/CloudWatch-CrossAccountSharing*"
          ],
          "Effect": "Allow"
        }
      ]
    },
    "VersionId": "v1",
    "IsDefaultVersion": true,
    "CreateDate": "2019-07-23T09:59:27+00:00"
  }
}

Version History (8 recorded)

Raw history

v1updated

scope changed, no action added or removed

Mar 12, 2026

81eed91

Update detected