Deprecated
Removed from AWS on 2021-04-02 - Active for 3 years, 5 months
AWSLambdaFullAccess
Last Modified
Sep 16, 2019
September 16, 2019 at 03:19 PM UTC
Version
v8
Total Versions
6
Created
Nov 27, 2017
Actions
52
Risk
HighAn unrestricted escalation path, identity administration, secret reads or the power to switch off security monitoring. Read from this policy document alone: trust policies, boundaries and SCPs in your account still decide what actually succeeds. How this is assessed
- High
Can change identities and their permissions
Grants 1 permissions management action on IAM, IAM Identity Center or Organizations, on any resource with no condition.
iam:passroleUse with caution: Grant it only to identity administrators, and protect your admin roles and SCPs with a permissions boundary or an SCP of their own.
- High
Can launch resources that run as a more privileged role
Grants every action of 3 documented escalation paths on any resource with no condition.
Use with caution: Make sure no highly privileged role trusts the service involved, and restrict iam:PassRole in your own policies or boundary to named roles with iam:PassedToService.
- High
Can take over existing resources that run as another role
Grants every action of 3 documented escalation paths on any resource with no condition.
Use with caution: List the roles attached to the functions, instances, pipelines or notebooks it can modify: the holder effectively has them too.
- Medium
Can switch off security monitoring
Can delete CloudWatch log groups, which is how an intruder hides.
logs:DeleteLogGroup (via logs:*)Use with caution: Deny these actions with an SCP for everyone outside a break-glass role, so no single policy can blind you.
- Medium
Can read secrets
Reads Lambda environment variables, where credentials often live, on any resource with no condition.
lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration (via lambda:*)Use with caution: Where the holder needs only some secrets, write your own policy scoped to their ARNs or tags, and limit decryption in the KMS key policies.
- Medium
Can rewrite resource policies and sharing
Grants 47 permissions management actions across 7 services (cloudwatch, dynamodb, events, iot, lambda, logs, ...) on any resource, enough to share resources outside the account.
cloudwatch:assumeaccessprofilecloudwatch:createaccessgrantcloudwatch:createaccessprofilecloudwatch:createdomainaccessgrantfororganizationcloudwatch:deleteaccessgrantcloudwatch:deleteaccessprofilecloudwatch:deletedomainaccessgrantfororganizationcloudwatch:updateaccessprofiledynamodb:deleteresourcepolicydynamodb:putresourcepolicyevents:deleteresourcepolicyevents:putpermissionand 35 moreUse with caution: Turn on IAM Access Analyzer external access findings, and keep account-level guards like S3 Block Public Access enabled.
- Medium
Can read data in every bucket or table
Reads any object in any S3 bucket; any DynamoDB table. Read-only is not the same as harmless when the data is the asset.
s3:GetObject (via s3:*)dynamodb:Scan (via dynamodb:*)dynamodb:GetItem (via dynamodb:*)Use with caution: Read access to data is still access to data. For people who only need to see configuration, ViewOnlyAccess carries none of these signals.
- Medium
Full access to 6 services on every resource
Uses cloudwatch:*, dynamodb:*, events:*, lambda:*, logs:*, s3:* with Resource "*" and no condition, so every action AWS adds to those services later is granted too.
cloudwatch:*dynamodb:*events:*lambda:*logs:*s3:*Use with caution: The grant grows every time the service does. For long-lived access, prefer a policy that lists the actions you actually need.
Policy Document
View on GitHub{
"PolicyVersion": {
"Document": {
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet",
"cloudformation:DescribeStackResources",
"cloudformation:DescribeStacks",
"cloudformation:GetTemplate",
"cloudformation:ListStackResources",
"cloudwatch:*",
"cognito-identity:ListIdentityPools",
"cognito-sync:GetCognitoEvents",
"cognito-sync:SetCognitoEvents",
"dynamodb:*",
"ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups",
"ec2:DescribeSubnets",
"ec2:DescribeVpcs",
"events:*",
"iam:GetPolicy",
"iam:GetPolicyVersion",
"iam:GetRole",
"iam:GetRolePolicy",
"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies",
"iam:ListRolePolicies",
"iam:ListRoles",
"iam:PassRole",
"iot:AttachPrincipalPolicy",
"iot:AttachThingPrincipal",
"iot:CreateKeysAndCertificate",
"iot:CreatePolicy",
"iot:CreateThing",
"iot:CreateTopicRule",
"iot:DescribeEndpoint",
"iot:GetTopicRule",
"iot:ListPolicies",
"iot:ListThings",
"iot:ListTopicRules",
"iot:ReplaceTopicRule",
"kinesis:DescribeStream",
"kinesis:ListStreams",
"kinesis:PutRecord",
"kms:ListAliases",
"lambda:*",
"logs:*",
"s3:*",
"sns:ListSubscriptions",
"sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic",
"sns:ListTopics",
"sns:Publish",
"sns:Subscribe",
"sns:Unsubscribe",
"sqs:ListQueues",
"sqs:SendMessage",
"tag:GetResources",
"xray:PutTelemetryRecords",
"xray:PutTraceSegments"
],
"Resource": "*"
}
]
},
"VersionId": "v8",
"IsDefaultVersion": true,
"CreateDate": "2017-11-27T23:22:38Z"
}
}Version History (6 recorded)
Raw historyUpdate detected
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Sep 16, 2019
49aa1d0Update detected
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Sep 16, 2019
71619cfUpdate detected
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Sep 16, 2019
8279033`2019-08-29`
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Aug 29, 2019
5016d52I updated my CLI and it looks like it reordered everything and changed the white-space, so everything looks changed, but is not
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Jul 12, 2019
9d2dff1First commit
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Feb 10, 2019
ad4c2e8