Deprecated
Removed from AWS on 2022-10-04 - Active for 4 years, 10 months
AWSDataPipelineRole
Last Modified
Sep 16, 2019
September 16, 2019 at 03:19 PM UTC
Version
v6
Total Versions
6
Created
Dec 22, 2017
Actions
59
Risk
HighAn unrestricted escalation path, identity administration, secret reads or the power to switch off security monitoring. Read from this policy document alone: trust policies, boundaries and SCPs in your account still decide what actually succeeds. How this is assessed
- High
Can change identities and their permissions
Grants 1 permissions management action on IAM, IAM Identity Center or Organizations, on any resource with no condition.
iam:passroleUse with caution: Grant it only to identity administrators, and protect your admin roles and SCPs with a permissions boundary or an SCP of their own.
- High
Can launch resources that run as a more privileged role
Grants every action of 3 documented escalation paths on any resource with no condition.
Use with caution: Make sure no highly privileged role trusts the service involved, and restrict iam:PassRole in your own policies or boundary to named roles with iam:PassedToService.
- High
Can take over existing resources that run as another role
Grants every action of 1 documented escalation path on any resource with no condition.
Use with caution: List the roles attached to the functions, instances, pipelines or notebooks it can modify: the holder effectively has them too.
- Medium
Can rewrite resource policies and sharing
Grants 22 permissions management actions across 3 services (cloudwatch, elasticmapreduce, s3) on any resource, enough to share resources outside the account.
cloudwatch:assumeaccessprofilecloudwatch:createaccessgrantcloudwatch:createaccessprofilecloudwatch:createdomainaccessgrantfororganizationcloudwatch:deleteaccessgrantcloudwatch:deleteaccessprofilecloudwatch:deletedomainaccessgrantfororganizationcloudwatch:updateaccessprofileelasticmapreduce:deleteworkspaceaccesselasticmapreduce:putblockpublicaccessconfigurationelasticmapreduce:putworkspaceaccesss3:putaccessgrantsinstanceresourcepolicyand 10 moreUse with caution: Turn on IAM Access Analyzer external access findings, and keep account-level guards like S3 Block Public Access enabled.
- Medium
Can read data in every bucket or table
Reads any object in any S3 bucket; any DynamoDB table. Read-only is not the same as harmless when the data is the asset.
s3:GetObject (via s3:Get*)dynamodb:Scandynamodb:GetItemUse with caution: Read access to data is still access to data. For people who only need to see configuration, ViewOnlyAccess carries none of these signals.
- Medium
Full access to 2 services on every resource
Uses cloudwatch:*, elasticmapreduce:* with Resource "*" and no condition, so every action AWS adds to those services later is granted too.
cloudwatch:*elasticmapreduce:*Use with caution: The grant grows every time the service does. For long-lived access, prefer a policy that lists the actions you actually need.
Policy Document
View on GitHub{
"PolicyVersion": {
"Document": {
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"cloudwatch:*",
"datapipeline:DescribeObjects",
"datapipeline:EvaluateExpression",
"dynamodb:BatchGetItem",
"dynamodb:DescribeTable",
"dynamodb:GetItem",
"dynamodb:Query",
"dynamodb:Scan",
"dynamodb:UpdateTable",
"ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress",
"ec2:CancelSpotInstanceRequests",
"ec2:CreateSecurityGroup",
"ec2:CreateTags",
"ec2:DeleteTags",
"ec2:Describe*",
"ec2:ModifyImageAttribute",
"ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute",
"ec2:RequestSpotInstances",
"ec2:RunInstances",
"ec2:StartInstances",
"ec2:StopInstances",
"ec2:TerminateInstances",
"ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress",
"ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup",
"ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupEgress",
"ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces",
"ec2:CreateNetworkInterface",
"ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface",
"ec2:DetachNetworkInterface",
"elasticmapreduce:*",
"iam:GetInstanceProfile",
"iam:GetRole",
"iam:GetRolePolicy",
"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies",
"iam:ListRolePolicies",
"iam:ListInstanceProfiles",
"iam:PassRole",
"rds:DescribeDBInstances",
"rds:DescribeDBSecurityGroups",
"redshift:DescribeClusters",
"redshift:DescribeClusterSecurityGroups",
"s3:CreateBucket",
"s3:DeleteObject",
"s3:Get*",
"s3:List*",
"s3:Put*",
"sdb:BatchPutAttributes",
"sdb:Select*",
"sns:GetTopicAttributes",
"sns:ListTopics",
"sns:Publish",
"sns:Subscribe",
"sns:Unsubscribe",
"sqs:CreateQueue",
"sqs:Delete*",
"sqs:GetQueue*",
"sqs:PurgeQueue",
"sqs:ReceiveMessage"
],
"Resource": [
"*"
]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringLike": {
"iam:AWSServiceName": [
"elasticmapreduce.amazonaws.com",
"spot.amazonaws.com"
]
}
}
}
]
},
"VersionId": "v6",
"IsDefaultVersion": true,
"CreateDate": "2017-12-22T23:43:28Z"
}
}Version History (6 recorded)
Raw historyUpdate detected
No recorded action delta - this version predates the change index. View the raw diff.
Sep 16, 2019
49aa1d0Update detected
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Sep 16, 2019
71619cfUpdate detected
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Sep 16, 2019
8279033`2019-08-29`
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Aug 29, 2019
5016d52I updated my CLI and it looks like it reordered everything and changed the white-space, so everything looks changed, but is not
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Jul 12, 2019
9d2dff1First commit
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Feb 10, 2019
ad4c2e8